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Abstract 
On a basis of an ascertaining analysis, the present paper aims at emphasizing the characteristics of understanding 
moral notions by children as well as the level of moral development. The concrete-situational character of the 
understanding of moral notions and even the impossibility to define these notions until the stage age of 8 years and to 
those with an IQ under average are the attributes of moral development during later childhood. The fear of 
punishment is the main reason which determines the child to adopt a certain moral behaviour. Intellectual 
development does not represent a determining factor of a moral action even if it mediates the understanding of moral 
notions. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of moral, of the genesis and determinants of moral is a difficult problem which made J. 
Piaget affirm „It is true that the investigations on intelligence are easier than the investigations on 
moral...” (Piaget, 1980). 
Moral judgement implies the evaluation (and more often self-evaluation) of certain behaviours and 
situations through relating them to moral requirements imposed by the social-historical background of the 
individual. It is formed through social learning and a critical acquisition of the behavioural models 
promoted by society. Moral development is an active process of organizing experience in structures with 
a growing significance, through which moral values are seen from a new perspective. 
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In the opinion of J. Piaget the development of moral behaviour is achieved gradually, implying an 
orderly covering of certain stages of intelligence, this progress being characterized by a particular 
thinking (Piaget, 1980).  
The development of moral judgement is achieved in close connection to the cognitive ontogenetic 
development so that as they mature children go through a „heteronomous” stage which develops towards 
an „autonomous” stage. During the heteronomous stage, the child poaches moral norms and rules from 
the immediate background, the moral judgement being non-selective, non-situational, and rigid targeting 
the fact and not the motivation. Subsequently, it becomes autonomous, by interiorization and the 
implication of his own system of values in the act of emitting a moral judgement. (Birch, 2000) The child 
can think for himself and his morality is rather a product of his own reason than of other persons’ 
constraints. 
L. Kohlberg, who intended to identify psychical mechanisms and operational processes lying at the 
base of the individual moral judgements, constructed a theoretical model of moral development in 
ontogenesis on three levels, each of them having 2 distinct phases. Level I – premoral or preconventional 
is covered between 4 – 10 years, level II – of conventional moral is situated between 10 – 13 years, and 
level III – of postconventional moral is attained after 13 years (Kohlberg, 1981).  
At the preconventional level the moral rules are perceived under the form of good/bad, correct/wrong, 
but they are interpreted, either in terms of physical consequences or in the hedonistic terms of action 
(punishment, reward). Morality consists in avoiding to break the rules, in unconditional conformity, for 
the  sake  of  obedience  and  in  order  to  avoid  his  own  physical  injury  or  the  injury  of  his  property.  The  
moral  behaviour  of  the  child  is  guided  by  the  avoidance  of  the  punishment  inflicted  by  the  adult,  as  a  
representative of the authority. (Habermans, 2000) 
At the second stage of this level of morality, the instrumental hedonism respects the norms in order to 
obtain a reward or the adult’s sympathy. Morality consists in obeying the rules in order to attain and 
achieve the immediate personal interest, especially in terms of an immediate, equal and equitable change, 
as a good business. (Kohlberg, 1981) The second level of justification or rightfulness consists in being 
moral because, first, this serves personal interests and needs, in a world in which everyone must admit 
that other people have their interests, too.  
With  the  child,  the  distinction  between truth  and lie,  between true  and false  is  progressive.  If  until  6  
years, due to a „magical type thinking” the child cannot tell among lie, play and fable, after 8 years lie 
will acquire an intentional dimension. J . Piaget (Piaget, 1980) asserts that the tendency to lie is natural 
until the age of 5, being an essential component of children’s egocentrism. 
Between the two stages, during the first, before 6 years, when play, fable and fantasm are the dominant 
traits and the second, after 8 years when deliberate lie appears, there is a sequence in which truth and false 
are distinct but lie intermingles with false. (Bascou, 1975) We can speak of the pseudo-lie until 6 years, of 
utilitarian lie in order to gain an advantage or to avoid an inconvenience, a punishment, to avoid stressing 
situations and of compensatory lie emitted in order to seek an image the subject believes to be 
inaccessible or lost, due to the wish to get oneself noticed, to the need of being helped or by imitating the 
adults’ behaviour (Crain, 1985). 
The act of lying implies a certain projective, ideational capacity, going beyond the present (as a 
general rule, the lier is an unsatisfied individual), the knowledge of truth but also the abstention of telling 
it, of expressing it. (Cucoú, 1997). 
2. Objectives 
The  initial  idea  was  based  on  the  empirical  observation  of  the  fact  that  during  childhood,  the  moral  
notions of true and false do not have a clearly determined content, being used differently, sometimes 
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according to the context and that lie, as a form of truth distortion, has either the form of a fable in order to 
draw others’ attention, or is a means to obtain a reward or to avoid punishment. 
The identification of the characteristics of the understanding of moral notions lie and truth by children 
constituted the main purpose of our study. Therefore we have assumed that the understanding of moral 
notions at children correlates positively both with the age and with the level of intellectual development. 
3. Method 
3.1. Participants  
The study analyzed a number of 145 children – pupils in the I-st – IV-th grades, boys (44,2%) and girls 
(55,8%). From the point of view of the age the sample includes:  32 subjects from the age category 6-7 
years, 38 subjects from the age category 7-8 years, 36 subjects from the age category  8-9years and 39 
subjects of 9 -10years. As for the gender distribution there was no determined significant difference 
among the different categories of age. 
3.2. Materials  
The understanding of the significance of the pair of truth and lie moral notions has been examined 
through a semistructured questionnaire elaborated by us to this effect and which includes a set of 10 
questions with open answers of the type „What do you think a lie is?”, „What do you think the truth is?”, 
„Tell a bad lie!”, „Tell a nice lie!”, „Because he didn’t do the homework Andrei told his mother he had a 
headache and he cannot go to school. Did Andrei tell a lie? Should he be punished? What punishment 
should he get?” etc.  
In establishing the coefficient of intellectual development, the Matrix Progressive Raven has been used 
(MPR) as this test can evaluate „educational ability”, the capacity to make comparisons, to detach the 
implicite relations from a structure, to develop a logical method of independent thinking from the 
previously gained information as well as the capacity to arrive at reasoning through analogy. Even if the 
MPR is an intellectual test par excellence, it also singularizes temperamental and motivational traits of 
personality which can be obvious in the subject’s behaviour during test resolving. 
3.3. Procedure 
The evaluation of each child participant at the study has been performed individually, following an 
established minimal collaboration relationship, based primarily on comfort and security. The experiment 
application has been achieved within the educational units the subjects attended, in three stages: the test 
Matrix Progressive Raven has been applied at first stage, then the set of questions meant to identify the 
degree of understanding moral notions and, the situational items sample in the third stage. There was no 
time limit in applying the experiment.
4. Results 
The primary analysis of the results has been carried out by calculating the incidence of the answers at 
the questions of the questionnaire on age categories and level of intellectual development. The following 
categories which singularize the level of understanding the moral notions have been grouped for the 
statistical analysis of the results: correct understanding, understanding through exemplifications, incorrect 
understanding, nonanswers. 
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The association between the understanding of moral notions and the age of subjects is confirmed by 
the rejection of the null hypothesis - Ȥ²(critical)= 9,48; Ȥ²(calculated)=17,85; p=0,001, which means that 
the understanding of moral notions is mediated by the subjects’age. By calculating chi-square in case of 
associating the understanding of moral notions with with the intellectual development , Ȥ²(critical)= 3,58; 
Ȥ²(calculated)=53,67; p=0,002 have been obtained, which confirms that results are distributed according 
to the scores obtained by the subjects at the intelligence test MPR, the null hypothesis being rejected. 
5. Discussion 
As regards the first hypothesis formulated by us from the analysis of the answers, we have noticed the 
concrete-situational character of the understanding of moral notions. We observe from this dichotomy the 
distinction between two moral values „good” and „bad” even if they do not define the notions of truth and 
lie correctly, as well the association with the intuitive concrete of their life. In a second place, there also 
appears the association of the two moral values with the beautiful and the ugly from the social life (lie is 
defined by some children „deed/word/thing/something beautiful and truth act/word/thing/something bad).  
As  they  were  unable  to  define  the  notions,  the  subjects  with  an  QI  under  average  try  to  use  
exemplifications in which we nevertheless observe the opposition of the two notions – „lie is when you 
don’t tell the truth”, „truth is when you don’t lie”, „you should tell when you have lied”. At 6 - 7 years a 
concrete-situational motivation of lie is offered („a lie is when you got a bad mark and you tell at home 
you got a good one”, „a lie is when you disobey your parents”). 
In defining lie, the generalization begins to appear with children around 8 – 9 years when defining the 
notion is associated with the deliberate distortion of truth „a lie means to hide something”, „a lie is 
untrue” etc. Starting with the age of 9 years, the generalization of the notion of truth begins to appear 
under the form „truth means to tell the right thing”, „truth means not to hide anything”etc.  
There is a category of children who cannot define these two notions  (subjects with the chronological 
age under 7 years and those with an QI under average) nevertheless affirming that „it is not good to lie”, 
„we should always tell the truth ”, „lie has short legs”, „it is not nice of you to lie” etc. We consider that 
from the point of view of moral development the rule is known but the child does not have the intellectual 
capacity to realize the generalization and to express the content of the notion by a definition. However, 
we cannot establish a differentiation of this category of children according to any of the factors taken into 
consideration (this category includes children of 6-7 years but also children of 9 – 10 years). 
The analysis of the results identified to some children of 7 – 8 years and to those with the QI under .80 
the confusion of lie with the fabrication, maintained within the limits of the play or fable („the lie is a 
hoax”). 
Asking children to tell a lie we have observed that beginning with the age of 7 years, lie represents in 
most cases a distortion of truth told with utilitarian ends, in order to avoid punishment or to obtain a 
reward.  
This analysis also showed the apparition of a generalization by appreciating others’ moral actions and 
then by appreciating own moral acts (at 7 years, truth and lie are exemplified by the classmates’ actions – 
„he lied he had got a good mark”, „he told us he had a new phone and he has not”etc. - at 9 - 10 years 
references are made to the own moral behaviour - „I said I had got a good mark but I didn’t”, „I boasted 
about my new phone but I don’t have a new one”, „I fouled my grandmother that a neighbour came” etc., 
but none uses the term of lie in order to define own behaviour). The exactness of one’s moral behaviour is 
achieved by relating it to the norms and rules imposed by the adult’s authority. All levels of age show 
also a tautological definion of the sphere of moral notions of truth and lie, children producing, relatively 
frequent, confuse and unsatisfactory explanations („a lie is when you tell a lie”, „truth means to tell the 
truth”, „ a lie means not to lie”, „the lie is a little lie” etc.).  
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By the situational test we have aimed at the identification of the moral rule interiorization level, of the 
attitude towards punishment and the correspondence between the punishment and the weight of the act.  
As regards the acknowledgement of lie in a concrete situation, all subjects identified the child’s wrong 
behaviour but the attitude towards punishment is different. At the question if „he should be punished 
because he had lied” subjects having the chronological age of 6 and 7 answer in proportion of 84% that 
„he shouldn’t be punished because he had forgotten to do his homework” . Only 12% of the subjects of 6 
– 7 years say that he should be punished because he had lied, and 2% say that „he should be punished in 
order to lie another time, too”. Subjects of over 8 years affirm only in proportion of 34% that he should 
not be punished, 46% choose punishment because he had lied and not because he had broken the window 
and 16% say that he should be punished because he had broken the window. This distribution of 
percentage can be explained by the fact that in the moral reasoning, the weight of the act is more 
important than hiding or distorting truth (breaking the window means a concrete thing, visible while 
distortion of truth cannot be always verified).  
The answers to the question „why do you think the boy lied?” confirm the hypothesis formulated by 
us. Most subjects (92%) of 6-7 years consider that „the boy did well lying” because „he was not 
punished” (he didn’t take into account the consequences for his friend who could be punished instead of 
him). The subjects of 8 – 9 years consider only in proportion of 43% that it is a correct behaviour. At the 
age of over 10 years the proportion of those using lie in order to avoid punishment diminishes (14%) 
which is an argument of moral autonomy. 
The analysis of percentage differences from the perspective of the variable intellectual development 
emphasizes the fact that subjects having a low intellectual coefficient exibit fear in relation to adult 
authority in a broad proportion and use lie in order to avoid punishment, while subjects having a high QI 
choose to assume punishment. 
6. Conclusion 
Seeking to determine concretely the particulars of the undestanding of the moral notions truth and lie 
by children, we have taken into consideration the fact that only after 8 years, lie will acquire the 
intentional dimension, up to this age we can speak about pseudo-lie, about utilitarian lie emitted  in order 
to gain an advantage or to avoid an inconvenience, a punishment, to avoid stressing situations and of 
compensatory lie emitted in order to seek an image the subject believes to be inaccessible or lost, due to 
the wish to get oneself noticed, to the need of being helped or by imitating the adults’ behaviour. 
Educators’ familiarity with such conclusions will allow them to project and organize activities which 
would facilitate both the interiorization of moral norms and rules but also a correct understanding of the 
content of such notions. (Bơs, 1972) Beside the affective and volitional component, a determining role is 
played by moral judgement which starts from the adequate understanding of the content of moral notions. 
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